Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Culpable states of mind: Culpable states of mind, in psychology and law, refer to mental states indicating criminal intent or responsibility. Examples include knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally engaging in illegal actions. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Neuroscience on Culpable States of Mind - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 143 Culpable States of Mind/neuroscience/Nadler/Mueller: Some researchers have suggested that neuroscientific techniques will be the future of assessing mental states (Meixner, 2012(1); Meixner and Rosenfeld 2014(2). Eggen and Laury, 2012(3); Farah, 2005(4)). However, there is general agreement that the state of the art does not yet meet evidentiary standards for this purpose (Meixner, 2012(1); Brown and Murphy, 2010(5)). >Mental states, >Neurobiology, >Neuroimaging. Credibility assessment: The neuroscience underlying credibility assessment and other mental state tools has not yet reached the standards that Daubert requires for admissibility. Realistic field tests have not yet been undertaken. And while there have been advances in fMRI techniques that allow for general assessment of current mental states while in the scanner (e.g. decoding what stimulus a person was viewing or imagining) (see Haynes and Rees, 2006(6) for review), methods are far from being able to accurately pinpoint past mental states (Brown and Murphy, 2010(5); Jones et al., 2009(7)). Evidence: It is also important to keep in mind that bad reasoning is more likely to be overlooked when neuroscience data - even irrelevant information - is also presented (Weisberg et al., 2008)(8), and that many reports about the capabilities of neuroscience often gloss over critical nuances (Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013)(9). Fortunately, the viewing of brain images by jurors deciding criminal liability does not in itself appear to have biasing effects - the influence of brain images, if any, tracks the influence of conventional neuroscience expert testimony (Roskies, Schweitzer, and Saks, 2013)(10). 1. Meixner, John B. (2012). "Liar, Liar, Jury's the Trier - The Future of Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court." NW. UL Rev. 106: 1451. 2. Meixner, John B. and J. Peter Rosenfeld (2014). "Detecting Knowledge of Incidentally Acquired, Real-world Memories Using a P 300-based Concealed-Information Test." Psychological Science 25(11): 1994-2005. 3. Eggen, Jean Macchiaroli and Eric J. Laury (2011). " Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging will Transform Tort Doctrine." Colum. sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 13:235. 4. Farah, Martha J. "Neuroethics: the Practical and the Philosophical." Trends in Cognitive sciences 9(1):34-40. 5. Brown, Teneille and Emily Murphy (2010). "Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States." Stanford Law Review 62(4): 1119-1208. 6. Haynes, John-Dylan and Geraint Rees (2006). "Decoding Mental States from Brain Activity in Humans." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 7(7):523-534. 7. Jones, Owen D., Joshua Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall, and Rene Marois (2009). "Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed." Stanford Technology Law Review 5, Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 10-09. 8. Weisberg, Deena Skolnick, Frank C. Keil, Joshua Goodstein, Elizabeth Rawson, and Jeremy R. Gray (2008). "The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 20(3):470-477. 9. Satel, Sally and Scott O. Lilienfeld (2013). Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience. New York: Basic Books. 10. Roskies, Adina L., Nicholas J. Schweitzer, and MichaelJ. Saks (2013). "Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing than Feared." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17(3):99—101. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Neuroscience Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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